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The idea that guilt and Judaism are closely interlinked has a long
historical legacy. After discussing recent work on anthropology and
emotion focusing on shame and guilt, we examine three theories
purporting to account for this link: psychoanalytic, theological, and
guilt as a cultural stereotype particularly the notion of the Jewish
mother.
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What’s Jewish Alzheimer’s disease? It’s when you forget everything but
the guilt.
The idea of guilt is deeply ingrained in Jewish culture both in everyday
discourse and is enshrined both literature and in humor. As Rabbi Harlan
Wechsler (1990) asserted, deep in the Jewish tradition, deep in the Jewish
Psyche of the Bible, is a human being who can experience guilt. More
than guilt’s being a problem is that it is second nature to the Jews. Molly
Jong-Fast, Erica Jong’s daughter (American poet), stated that “we suffer two
great inheritances of the Jewish people: irritable bowel syndrome and guilt,”
and deemed our quintessential Jewish way of life as “praying on a shrink’s
sofa” (Jong-Fast, 2005). From the literary perspective, the notion of Jewish
guilt was famously popularized by Martin Roth in his classic Pourtnoy’s
Complaint—the story of Alexander Pourtnoy, a young Jewish man brought
up by highly neurotic parents who is experiencing sexual guilt. The notion of
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the overbearing and highly critical Jewish mother has been a popular theme
in American cinema.
But what is the origin of this guilt? Is it related in any way to Jewish the-
ology, the history of the Jews, or is it a relatively recent cultural stereotype
originating from the time of the emigration of Jews from Eastern Europe to
the United States at the turn of the 20th century? Or is there something inher-
ent in the Jewish psyche, as Freud argues, which predisposes Jews to guilt?
There is little evidence that Jews as a religious and cultural group experience
guilt to a greater extent than other groups, although epidemiological stud-
ies are lacking. The topic of Jewish guilt raises significant issues in relation
to the emerging study of religion and emotion and, more specifically, how
religious factors shape affect.
THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF GUILT
The anthropology of emotion is a slowly growing field within social anthro-
pology. For a long time, following Durkheim, anthropologists have ignored
emotions, viewing them as capricious, subjective, and changeable; they were
considered biological (Durkheim used “effervescence”), more the province
of psychology and biology than anthropology. In the first few decades of the
20th century there was a divergence in the study of emotion: an emphasis
on Freudian psychoanalysis in Europe and culture and personality theory in
North America. From the 1970s, anthropologists began to focus more directly
on emotions, questioning their nature (innate or cultural) and their role in
social life. Most anthropologists would now agree that emotions are culturally
constructed and that they become incorporated into the broader conceptual
repertoire of culture and prevailing cultural values, and beliefs are infused
into the meaning of named emotions. Not only do cultural factors shape
emotions but emotions support and shape culture.
Biological and evolutionary evidence indicates that emotions are not
infinitely malleable and that there are primary emotions that are largely
precultural. Psychologist Paul Ekman (1971) showed that despite some
idiosyncratic differences, the basic emotions—anger, fear, sadness, and
happiness—are predominantly biological and thus, are universal, expressed
and perceived in similar way across all cultures. Robert Levy (1984) noted
that metaphors of emotion, for instance anger, are similar across cultures.
At the other extreme, some assert that emotions are totally cultural and
expressed in social relations, are embodied, and affect power relationships.
For instance Lutz (1988, p. 5) asserted that emotional experience is not
precultural but preeminently cultural. Rosaldo (1980) noted how the mean-
ing of emotional words resides in the pragmatics of social life. They are felt
thoughts in which the cultural habitus of power is embedded within the
physical being of the relational self (Lindholm, 2005) and are the physical
expression of authority.
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The Origins of Jewish Guilt 125
Several questions arise in relation to guilt. Can we legitimately argue
that the experience of guilt is the same across cultural groups? More specif-
ically, can we assume that what biblical scholars identify as guilt in the
Old Testament texts is the same as our contemporary emotion labeled guilt?
Research in this area is plagued by difficulty; there are notorious difficulties
translating emotional words from one language to another. Of note is the
longstanding anthropological discussion of shame and guilt societies.
Ruth Benedict (1954) maintains that shame is a violation of cultural
or social values while guilt feelings arise from violations of one’s internal
values. Thus, it is possible to feel ashamed of thought or behavior that no
one knows about and to feel guilty about actions that gain the approval of
others. Guilt and shame are similar emotions in that both involve feeling bad
about one self. Guilt is generally associated with something one has done
(or not done). There are differences in phenomenology. Shame necessitates
awareness of self in relation to others; in guilt there is awareness of self
in relation to some act. Guilt is more cognitive than shame and involves an
obsession with violation (Lewis, 1971). In guilt, the self demands punishment
for the violation. Shame, on the other hand, is often experienced as a feeling
of being a bad, unworthy, hateful person. Both are states of being negatively
valued by self and others, self-conscious emotions, because one has failed to
meet standards of what is appropriate or right. They require an ability to see
the self as an object of evaluation. Konstan (2003) noted that shame’s status
as a moral emotion has been impugned by critics, among them theologians
and anthropologists, who consider it a primitive precursor to guilt: shame,
the argument goes, responds to the judgments of others and is indifferent
to ethical principles in themselves, whereas guilt is an inner sensibility and
corresponds to the morally autonomous self of modern man.
Different cultures emphasize shame and guilt to different extents. Japan,
for example, is a shame culture, while the United States is a guilt culture.
Collectivistic cultures emphasize the fundamental relatedness of individu-
als to each other, for example by valuing attending to others, fitting in,
and harmonious interdependence with them. In contrast, individuals in
individualistic cultures hold an independent view of the self and seek to
maintain their independence from others by attending to the self and by
discovering and expressing their unique inner attributes. Emotion research is
individualistic and American in orientation.
Cross-cultural studies suggest that the valuation, elicitors, and behav-
ioral consequences, as well as the distinction between guilt and shame,
vary across individualistic and collective cultures (Wong & Tsai, 2007). Non-
Western cultures are collectivist—other people’s thoughts are important and
influence the self. In such cultures feeling bad about the self is valued and
leads to self-improvement. In some cultural groups, distinctions between
shame and guilt are blurred and may be less marked in cultures that promote
an interdependent self (Wong & Tsai, 2007). Shame in many non-Western
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cultures is valued. Stephen Pattison (2000, p. 129) remarked, “While guilt
may have a very constructive role in creating and maintaining social rela-
tionships and moral responsibilities, shame has a much more dubious effect.”
Whereas Western models of shame and guilt view guilt as good and shame
as bad, cross-cultural studies suggest that shame may have better and more
adaptive consequences.
WHERE DOES JEWISH GUILT DERIVE FROM?
Rabbi Jeremy Rosen, Orthodox rabbi, author, and lecturer, best known for
advocating an approach to Jewish life that is open to the benefits of moder-
nity and tolerant of individual variations while remaining committed to
halacha (Jewish law), speculated on the origin of Jewish guilt:
Some lay the blame at the door of Christianity and its preoccupation
with original sin, the Greek dichotomy between body and mind, so that
body is bad, sex a concession, celibacy the ideal. This explains their
traditions of self-flagellation and monastic asceticism. Perhaps it was a
Medieval Jewish response to Christian Crusader piety? But that is too easy.
You can find similar ideas in Jewish sources of two thousand years ago.
. . . The Holocaust exacerbated things of course. Guilt is even stronger
amongst the children of Holocaust survivors than survivors themselves.
In Israel so many have lost a relative, a friend or suffered in some way.
Perhaps it is the guilt of survival that weighs heavily. Or perhaps it’s the
realization that the wonderful dreams and ideals of Zionism, of an ethical,
just society, have been lost, and we are all to blame for our current greed
and corruption. (Rosen, 2008, paras. 5, 7)
These assertions have little historical backing although the description of
Holocaust survivor guilt is well recognized. We shall now examine three
hypotheses attempting to explain Jewish guilt: psychoanalytic, theologi-
cal and religious, and the concept of the Jewish mother and assimilation.
We begin with Freud’s psychoanalytic theories.
FREUD AND PSYCHOANALYSIS
Freud observed that guilt plays a fundamental role in the psyche, and that
it mainly works unconsciously as the main force in the psychic causality
that leads to drive renunciation and towards the development of intellectu-
ality. Guilt, in Freud’s view, derived from a violation of a law, resulting in
a sense of guilt. Freud appealed to an anthropological theory, which spec-
ulates that early in civilization there was a murder of the primal father. This
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The Origins of Jewish Guilt 127
murder, according to Freud, is the missing link that explains the functioning
of prohibition in the economy of the drives. It is the father’s death that
initiates the law and therefore functions as the origin of all father religions.
In Moses and Monotheism, Freud (1939/1967) contradicted the biblical
story of Moses asserting that Moses only led his close followers into free-
dom during an unstable period in Egyptian history after Akhenaten. They
subsequently killed Moses in rebellion later joining with another monotheis-
tic tribe in Midian who worshiped a volcanic God. Freud argued that many
years after the murder of Moses, the rebels expressed regret at their action
and subsequently developed the concept of the Messiah as a hope for the
return of Moses as the savior of the Israelites. According to Freud, the guilt
from the murder of Moses is inherited through the generations; this guilt then
drives the Jews to religion to assuage their emotions. The book consists of
three parts, and like Totem and Taboo, is an extension of Freud’s work on
psychoanalytic theory as a means of generating hypotheses about historical
events. As in Totem and Taboo, he equates religion and neurosis:
That conviction I acquired a quarter of a century ago, when I wrote my
book on Totem and Taboo (in 1912), and it has only become stronger
since. From then on I have never doubted that religious phenomena are
to be understood only on the model of the neurotic symptoms of the
individual, which are so familiar to us, as a return to of long-forgotten
important happenings in the primeval history of the human family, that
they owe their obsessive character to that very origin and therefore derive
their effect on mankind from the historical truth they contain. (Freud,
1939/1967, p. 89)
Moses and Monotheism has been vilified and dismissed by critics on account
of his “scandalous” hypothesis that claims not only that Moses was not a
Jew but also that he was murdered by his own people in the wilderness.
As an historical hypothesis it lacks evidence. But as philosopher Richard
Bernstein (1998) noted, the book is not without merit in terms of furthering
our understanding of the unconscious dynamics of religion.
RELIGION AND GUILT
Guilt and religion have a longstanding association in Western Culture, and
some, such as Belgum (1963), asserted that guilt is the place where religion
and psychology meet. There are important differences in how religions use
guilt as a spiritual vehicle and as a form of social control. Whereas psychol-
ogy is interested in guilt as a subjective phenomenon, religions focus on guilt
as moral culpability based on objective behaviors. Psychology is interested in
how people behave—descriptive whereas religions focus upon how people
ought to behave—prescriptive.
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There is evidence that there has been a diminution in feelings of guilt in
the past 100 years due to the decline in the importance of religion in Western
societies (Orelli, 1954). Recent studies suggest that guilt feelings appear fairly
universally across cultures, however they are more prevalent in the western
world and hypochondriacal ideas are the core features of depression in non-
Christian cultures. From the European Middle Ages onwards, a process of
steadily increasing individualization took place, which found its culmination
in the beginning of the 19th century. This process was closely linked to the
transformation of a shame culture into a guilt culture. The gradual elabora-
tion of differentiated concepts of sin, guilt, remorse, and penitence in this
process was of crucial importance.
Albertsen, O’Connor, and Berry (2006) provided an excellent overview
of the relationship between religion and interpersonal guilt, and the dis-
cussion here derives from them. Although religion has been found to be
strongly related to a variety of psychological and health variables (Koenig,
McCullough, & Larson, 2001), few studies have incorporated religion in the
examination of cross-cultural differences in predisposition to guilt. It has
sometimes been suggested that religion fosters guilt in people (Ellis, 1980),
and some authors recognize a maladaptive, scrupulous, or penitent per-
sonality (Ciarrocchi, 1995; Spero, 1980; Van Ornum, 1997) associated with
excessive worry about sin and guilt. There is anecdotal evidence that mem-
bers of fundamentalist religions tend to have high levels of religious guilt
and fear (e.g., Barr, 1980; Hartz & Everett, 1989; Strozier, 1994).
Although a few empirical studies have examined the relationship
between guilt and religious participation, the specific type of guilt is rarely
clearly defined (Albertsen et al., 2006). Following a review of over 200 stud-
ies, Gartner, Larson, and Allen (1991) asserted that low levels of religiosity
are associated with impulse control disorders, including drug and alcohol
use, suicide, and antisocial behavior, whereas high levels of religiosity are
more often associated with disorders of over control, such as excessive
guilt. Studies have reported positive correlations between religiosity and gen-
eral guilt (Luyten, Corveleyn, & Fontaine, 1998), religiosity and guilt related
to sexual, hostile, or immoral impulses (Fehr & Stamps, 1979), and reli-
giosity and adaptive, shame-free guilt (Albertsen, 2002). However, to date,
research has not demonstrated a direct relationship between religiosity and
maladaptive interpersonal guilt (Albertsen, 2002).
Only a few studies have explored guilt across religious traditions, with
individuals from the Catholic religious tradition typically experiencing higher
levels of guilt. London, Schulman, and Black (1964) reported a higher guilt
in Protestant and Catholic samples compared with a Jewish sample in the
Midwest region of the United States. In a Dutch sample, feelings of guilt were
more prevalent in Roman Catholics than in Calvinists or nonchurch mem-
bers (Braam, Sonnenberg, Beekman, Deeg, &Van-Tilburg, 2000). Of note,
however, is the fact that the setting of Braam’s study in the Netherlands may
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The Origins of Jewish Guilt 129
reduce generalizability to people in the United States. In the only published
study comparing religious traditions specifically on maladaptive interpersonal
guilt, Catholics and Lutherans were significantly higher than Buddhists and
Episcopalians in the United States (Albertsen, 2002). Such studies suggest that
certain religious traditions, such as Catholicism, may tend to foster higher lev-
els of guilt among their members, or that different religious traditions attract
members—on either the community or the individual scale—with different
levels of guilt. There is nothing in the tenets of Judaism that engenders guilt
to a higher degree than found in most religions. This means Judaism is not
any more subject to neuroticism than any other major world faith or ideology.
GUILT AND SHAME IN THE OLD TESTAMENT
It was William Robertson Smith (1889), a Scottish orientalist, Old Testament
scholar, professor of divinity, and minister of the Free Church of Scotland,
who first presented a somewhat speculative account of the origins of sin and
guilt in ancient Judaism following the Babylonian conquest. According to
Smith, the large and powerful kingdom was divided and begin to fall: Israel
first, to the Assyrians. The power of Babylon rose, Judah was besieged, and
Jerusalem taken and the Temple destroyed. The people experienced adver-
sity, downfall, and exile; the prophets criticized them for their backsliding,
their whoring, their foreign women, their altars to other gods, and their
luxury. The sense of joy and prosperity celebrated previously went from
worship to be replaced increasingly by a sense of guilt, offense against God,
and the need to pacify his just anger by expiation and propitiation. After the
destruction of the kingdoms and experience of exile, the themes of sin and
punishment—of the need to atone—came to dominate the whole sacrificial
system, altering its character so that its focus is on sacrifice because of sin.
An understanding of guilt in Old Testament texts raises significant
problems of translation. To what extent do biblical terms refer to the con-
temporary emotion of guilt? And were the biblical writers referring to guilt
or shame? Guilt, sin, and sacrifice run closely together in the Hebrew Bible.
The Hebrew Bible does not deploy a unique word for guilt, but uses a sin-
gle word to signify: “sin, the guilt of it, the punishment due unto it, and a
sacrifice for it.” Guilt and sin are referred to as awon—to bear iniquity. The
term connotes lawlessness and rebellion.
The key concept underlying guilt in monotheistic religion is sin—a word
derived from the Latin word sont meaning guilt—but the two are not syn-
onymous. Sin is the consequence of violating a religious ordinance, whereas
guilt is not a moral violation but the result of one, both as culpability and
a feeling of remorse. Feelings of sin and guilt relate to God, and ideas of
sin and guilt and punishment constantly pass over into each other. This is
demonstrated by noting the use of the words whose common root is ‘-sh-m,
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the distinctive Hebrew term for guilt. In Lev. 5 to 7, in the adjective form it
is rendered “guilty,” in the noun as “trespass offering.” In Hos. 5:15 it seems
to mean punishment (see margin, “have borne their guilt,” and compare
Ezek. 6:6), while in Nu. 5:7−8 the idea is that of compensation (rendered
“restitution for guilt”). Asham is a guilt offering as a reparation mandated
for a specific offence such as breaking an oath. It requires that the sinner
make a sacrifice to God and involves paying a debt (guilt as debt). Ashem is
translated as being guilty and ashama for feeling guilty.
Guilt signifies alienation from God as a result of sin and only He can
absolve one from sin and guilt. All the biblical words for “sin” imply no
more than an error of judgment, to miss the mark, to step off the path, to fall
short. There is no “state of sin,” just mistakes that need to be avoided next
time. Just get back on the path. Sin in Judaism is similar to the Greek word
hamatria—missing the mark—making a mistake by not fulfilling the law.
Following the prophets, the ideas of sin, guilt, and righteousness devel-
oped more clearly as ethical and personal: “It is not ritual correctness that
counts with God, incense and sacrifices and new moons and Sabbaths, but
to cease to do evil, to learn to do well” (Isa. 1). Thus, the motive and the
inner spirit come in (Mic. 6:8; Isa. 57:15; 58:1−12), with guilt gaining a new
depth and quality and becoming more interiorized.
Guilt in the Old Testament is at the same time both individual and com-
munal. The biblical word for guilt, asham, is only once used of individuals.
Guilt in Judaism has a strong communal aspect—Yom Kippur is a collective
petition for forgiveness. But this is also an individual act whereby the individ-
ual personally reflects and repents. Kapporot is a Jewish ritual practiced by
some Jews on the eve of Yom Kippur. The person swings a live chicken or a
bundle of coins over one’s head three times, symbolically transferring one’s
sins to the chicken or coins—a form of guilt offering. The chicken is then
slaughtered and donated to the poor for consumption at the prefast meal.
A full understanding of the relationship between guilt and sin neces-
sitates a discussion of conscience—broadly defined as an aptitude, faculty,
intuition, or judgment of the intellect that distinguishes right from wrong.
In psychological terms conscience leads to feelings of remorse when a
human commits actions that go against their moral values and to feelings
of rectitude or integrity when actions conform to such norms.
Did the ancient Hebrews possess such a faculty? We have little direct
information about conscience in the ancient Hebrews, but some understand-
ing may be gleaned by examining surrounding cultures such as Greeks.
While we have little historical evidence of direct contact between the Ancient
Greeks and early Jewish culture, it is likely that such contact occurred. Dodds
(1951), in Greeks and the Irrational, drew upon ancient Greek literature to
examine the mind of the ancient Greeks. In the Iliad, the first clear picture
of the early Greek religion, Agamemnon offers an apology for compensating
himself for the loss of his mistress by stealing the mistress of Achilles. He
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The Origins of Jewish Guilt 131
asserts that he was not himself the cause of this act but it was due to divine
intervention by Erinys, a goddess, who removed his understanding. There
are numerous other passages in Homer in which unwise and unaccount-
able conduct is similarly attributed to supernatural agencies of one kind or
another.
Dodds contended that these explanations are not instances of poetic
license but are real psychological phenomena; ancient Greek psychology
differed from that of contemporary Western culture. This perception influ-
enced, among others, Julian Jaynes in his groundbreaking study The Origin
of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, and more recently
Antonio Damasio in The Feeling of What Happens, two later authors who
drew upon Dodds extensively.
Dodds maintained that a transition occurred from shame culture, which
characterized the worldview of the Iliad, to guilt culture, which emerges in
later Greek civilization. This is a central idea for which Dodds presented a
persuasive case, although his account suffers somewhat from being rather
strongly influenced by Freudian psychoanalytic theory, which appeared
more securely founded in science in the mid-20th century than it does today.
Dodds (1951) described an increasing sophistication in their develop-
ment, from a conception of the world and the moral order as arbitrary and
subject to the whim of the gods, through to a later understanding of the
limits of moral responsibility. Even among the great tragedians (for exam-
ple, Aeschylus’ Oresteian Trilogy), individuals were simply caught up in the
workings out of the curse of Atreus; Sophocles makes the issue of responsi-
bility more pertinent, and for Euripides it resides more fully in the individual.
Aristotle finally identified hamartia or “tragic fault” as an attribute of the
individual.
Like many other cultures, Greece and Rome did not use distinct terms
for what we now call shame and guilt, and they appear to recognize one
concept where we recognize two. This view, however, presupposes a nat-
ural correspondence among psychological ideas across linguistic and social
boundaries. Thus, the Greek term we customarily translate as shame is held
to match, more or less, the English concept, unless perhaps, in the absence
of a word for guilt, Greek shame had a somewhat wider extension so as to
include some (or all) of the modern notion of guilt. Alternatively, the ancient
Greeks simply failed to achieve a notion of guilt, which is in turn a sign
of the poverty of their moral vocabulary and their incomplete psychological
development.
There is no Hebrew term in the Old Testament that is a linguistic
equivalent for the classical Greek term suneidesis (suneivdhsi), or aware-
ness. The Hebrew term for “heart,” however, appears a prominent term of
self-awareness in the Old Testament. The lack of a developed concept of
conscience in the Old Testament, as is seen later in Paul, may be due to
the worldview of the Hebrews. Consciousness of life was of a relationship
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between God and a covenant community rather than an autonomous self-
awareness between a person and his or her world. The only usage of
suneidesis (suneivdhsi) in the canonical section of the Septuagint is in
Ecclesiastes 10:20, “Do not revile the king even in your thoughts, or curse
the rich in your bedroom,” where it is clearly used as self-reflection in secret
(cf. the only verbal variations in Job 27:6 and Lev 5:1). Rabbinic Judaism and
the Dead Sea Scrolls are consistent with the Old Testament in their lacking a
vocabulary of conscience.
The Old Testament does not clearly distinguish between physical and
spiritual organs, because the entire range of higher human functions such
as feeling, thinking, knowing, loving, keeping God’s commandments, prais-
ing, and praying is attributed not only to the “spiritual” organs of the soul
and spirit but also to the physical organs of the heart and, occasionally, to
the kidneys and viscera. The soul (nephesh) and the spirit (ruach) in the
Old Testament refer not to immaterial entities capable of surviving the body
after death, but to a whole spectrum of physical and psychological functions.
These terms refer not to wholly different substances, each with its own dis-
tinct functions, but to the interrelated and integrated capacities and functions
of the same person. The fact that a person is comprised of various parts
which are integrated, interrelated, and functionally united, undermines the
notion of the soul being distinct from the body and thus removing the basis
for the belief in the survival of the soul at the death of the body.
The heart in Biblical thought is seen as the spring of individual life,
the ultimate source of the physical, intellectual, emotional, and volitional
energies, and, consequently, the part of the person that normally has direct
contact with God. The recesses of the heart contain the thoughts, the atti-
tudes, the fears, and the hopes that determine the personality or character
of the individual. The emotions of the heart are portrayed vividly and con-
cretely. The heart is said to fail (Gen 42:28), to faint (Gen 45:26), to throb (Ps.
38:10), to tremble (1 Sam 28:5), to be stirred up (Prov. 23:17; Deut. 19:6), or
to be sick (Prov. 13:12). The state of the heart dominates every manifestation
of life. “A glad heart makes a cheerful countenance, but by sorrow of heart
the spirit is broken” (Prov. 15:13). Health is affected by the condition of the
heart. “A cheerful heart is a good medicine, but a downcast spirit dries up
the bones” (Prov. 17:22). Sometimes, physical organs can refer to something
similar to conscience: “David’s heart smote him” (1 Sam 24:5). Kidneys have
a similar meaning. “Thus my heart was grieved, and I was pricked in my
reins” (Ps. 73:21).
Critics, such as Malina and Rohrbaugh (1992), asserted that scholars have
confused shame and guilt, and have attributed guilt to the ancient Hebrews
when they were actually referring to shame. Two instances: Psalm 38:4 is
interesting, “My guilt has overwhelmed me like a burden too heavy to bear,”
and Proverbs 28:17, “A man tormented by the guilt of murder will be a
fugitive till death; let no one support him.”
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In relation to this assertion, Rohrbaugh (2010) stated:
No, these texts do not indicate that ancient people could be over-
come by guilt. They indicate that people could be overcome by shame.
Understanding the difference between guilt and shame is crucial here.
Guilt is an internal reaction to a violation of one’s own conscience.
It depends on the existence of an individual conscience—something
Middle Easterners do not have.
Shame is an internalization of the moral judgment that comes from outside,
from the group. In shame cultures it is the group that has the conscience,
not the individual. Thus when a group accuses one of violating its stan-
dards, deep shame is the result. That is what we read about in the Bible
(see 1 Cor. 4:4).
So finally, is there a relationship between Jewish practice and the devel-
opment of guilt? We would argue for this possibility. Jewish exegesis involves
pouring over texts and evaluating. The Hebrew word for prayer (tefillah)
comes from the root fallal, to evaluate. The Hebrew root means to think,
entreat, judge, or intercede; and the reflexive means to judge oneself, and to
pray. People evaluate themselves. This may be conducive psychologically to
the development of guilt.
JEWISH GUILT AS A STEREOTYPE
Jewish stereotypes are commonplace in Jewish and non-Jewish culture.
Common objects, phrases, and traditions used to emphasize or ridicule
Jewishness include bagels, playing violin, klezmer, undergoing circum-
cision, haggling, and uttering phrases like “mazal tov,” “shalom,” and
“oy vey.” Other Jewish stereotypes include the rabbi, the complaining
and guilt-inflicting Jewish mother stereotype, the spoiled and materialistic
Jewish-American princess, and the often-meek nice Jewish boy.
As Joshua Halberstam wrote in the Jewish Daily Forward (2005):
How, then, did this bromide about Jewish guilt attain its status as a dis-
tinctive Jewish disposition? Unlike jokes about kishke (intestines), which
Jews actually ate (and eat), and such slurs such as the Jews’ associa-
tion with money—originally propounded by non-Jews—the Jewish guilt
syndrome is a Jewish creation, the invention of the previous generation
of assimilated American Jews. When these Jews became untethered and
estranged from Jewish tradition and the established forms of expiation,
they created a psychologized specter of guilt as a “Jewish condition,”
a Judaism so lite, it fits on an HBO laugh track and on your friend’s
T-shirt.
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The Jewish mother or wife stereotype is one of the most common stereotypes
and stock characters employed by Jewish comedians and authors whenever
they discuss actual or fictional situations involving their mothers or other
females in their lives who possess mother-like qualities. The stereotype com-
prises of a nagging, overprotective, manipulative, controlling, smothering,
and overbearing mother or wife, who persists in interfering in her chil-
dren’s lives long after they have become adults and can care for themselves.
In Israel, where the geographical background of Jews is more diverse, the
same stereotypical mother is referred to as the Polish mother. Helmreich
(1984) correctly noted that the attributes of a Jewish mother—overprotection,
pushiness, aggression, and guilt-inducement—are found in mothers of other
ethnicities, from Italians through Blacks to Puerto Ricans. The association of
this otherwise gender stereotype with Jewish mothers in particular, accord-
ing to Helmreich, derives from the emphasis that is traditionally placed by
Judaism on the home and the family, and on the role of the mother within
that family.
The Jewish mother stereotype originated among the American Jewish
community, while its predecessors derived from Eastern Europe. This stereo-
type was further developed by the poverty and hardship of Eastern European
Jews immigrating into the United States (during the period 1881–1924, when
one of the largest waves of such immigration occurred), where the require-
ments of hard work by the parents were transmitted to children via guilt:
“We work so hard so that you can be happy.” Other aspects of the stereotype
originate from those immigrant Jewish parents’ ambitions for their children
to be successful, resulting in a desire for perfection and a continual dissatis-
faction with anything less: Hartman and Hartman (1996) speculated that the
root of the stereotype is in the self-sacrifice of first-generation immigrants,
unable themselves to take full advantage of American education themselves,
and the consequent transference of their aspirations, for success and social
status, from themselves to their children. A Jewish mother derives vicarious
social status from the achievements of her children, where she is unable to
achieve such status herself.
Although this stereotype was regularly portrayed in American cinema
from the 1970s onwards, according to Alisa Lebow (2008), in the late 20th
century and the 21st century the stereotype of the Jewish mother has all but
disappeared from movies. The Jewish mother stereotype has transformed in
the Jewish grandmother, or bubbe. While still unschooled, food-obsessed,
doting, loving, anxious, and a working class balabusta (good home-maker),
the Jewish grandmother is more mellow than her Jewish mother antecedent.
CONCLUSION
I have previously discussed a number of perspectives on Jewish guilt: anthro-
pological, psychoanalytic, and cultural. All provide some understanding of
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the relationship between Judaism and guilt. Although this article is predom-
inantly theoretical, I end by briefly discussing the implications of Jewish
guilt for psychotherapeutic work. Within the academic study of psychother-
apy there has been increasing attention given to the role of cultural factors
such as experiences of migration and racism (Kareem & Littlewood, 2000)
and spiritual factors such as relationship with God, religious observance,
and sin (Pargament, 2007) in the psychotherapeutic process. Psychological
distress, according to these authors, must be understood holistically and
move beyond individual biographical factors. Understanding guilt in ther-
apy among Jews necessitates incorporating wider cultural and theological
perspectives. Future work in this area should focus on the development of
culturally and spiritually focused therapy for this population.
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